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Abstract
We examine the relationship between application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) firms’ 
technology portfolios and their innovative performance. This relationship is complex, 
and we hypothesize that it changes according to the stage of ASIC technology evolution. 
We test our hypotheses using a longitudinal dataset of 67 firms from the ASIC industry 
over the period 1986–2003. We find that ASIC technology evolution negatively moder-
ates the effects of the size and diversity of the internal technology portfolio on ASIC 
firms’ innovative performance. This implies that, in earlier phases of ASIC technology 
evolution, successful ASIC firms developed large and diverse portfolios to cope with 
technological uncertainty. During later phases of ASIC technology evolution, they tend 
to have relatively smaller and less diverse portfolios, and they focus on unique, protect-
able, and exploitable advantages.
Keywords: ASIC industry, technology portfolio, technology diversity, innovation 
strategy, technology evolution, innovative performance
1. Introduction
We examine the relationship between the size and diversity of ASIC firms’ technology portfo-
lios and their innovative performance as ASIC technology evolves.
For many technology-based firms, in-house developed technology is crucial for the creation 
of innovations and for capturing innovation returns [1–3]. In-house technology development 
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative
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enables firms to increase the complexity of their innovations, so it becomes difficult for com-
petitors to imitate them [4]. It also enables firms to maintain secrecy and, in that way, to 
establish a lead time [5]. Especially, technology that is classified as “distinctive competencies” 
[6] and that forms the core of the firm’s technological capabilities will mostly be developed 
in-house because of these reasons. In-house technology development also creates absorptive 
capacity, i.e., the knowledge that enables firms to better understand, source, and use external 
technology [5, 7, 8].
In this chapter, we focus on the effects of the size and diversity of the in-house ASIC technol-
ogy portfolio on ASIC firms’ innovative performance. The size of the portfolio reflects the 
firms’ total efforts to develop ASIC technology in-house. The diversity of the portfolio reflects 
how firms’ development efforts are spread over various ASIC sub-technologies.
The relationship between the size and diversity of firms’ internal technology portfolios and their 
innovative performance is complex, and the results of the previous research have been conflict-
ing. We contribute to this research by investigating the moderating effect of technology evolu-
tion. As a moderator, we use Abernathy and Utterback’s concept of technology evolution of an 
industry [9]. They distinguish three evolutionary phases: the fluid phase, the transitional phase, 
and the specific phase. Currently, ASIC technology is in the specific phase, according to patent 
counts, and this is also indicated by the industry’s technology trends. The exact evolutionary 
phase may differ per ASIC sub-technology: gate array technology is at the end of its evolution, 
standard cell technology is in the late specific phase, and PLD technology is also in the specific 
phase. A competing technology such as FPGA is earlier in the specific phase. Emerging tech-
nologies, whether they are labeled as ASIC or as competing with ASIC, are in the fluid phase.
In the early, fluid phase of technology evolution, technological uncertainty is high, and firms 
need to keep various development options open to cope with that uncertainty. They need 
to develop large and diverse technology portfolios that are useful for various technology 
development scenarios. In the later, specific phase of technology evolution, after a “dominant 
design” has been established [10], technological uncertainty is much lower. This means that 
there is less need for large and diverse technology portfolios. This enables firms to focus on 
those technologies they can best exploit.
Managers of technology-based firms need to know whether and when during the evolution of 
a technology, investments in large or diverse technology portfolios contribute to their firms’ 
innovative performance. Building and maintaining such technology portfolios require large 
and risky resource investments, and it is therefore important to ensure the returns to these 
investments.
To study the effects of portfolio size and diversity on innovative performance during tech-
nology evolution, we developed a longitudinal dataset of 67 firms from the ASIC industry 
over the period 1986–2003. Our results support the moderating effect of technology evolution 
on the relationship between technology portfolio size and diversity and firms’ innovative 
performance. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of these 
relationships.
The practical implication is that ASIC firms need to adjust their technology sourcing strategy 
according to the phase of ASIC technology evolution. In earlier stages of technology evolution, 
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investing in a relatively large and diverse technology portfolio seems to be a better approach to 
improve innovative performance. In later stages, focusing on a relatively smaller and specialized 
technology portfolio seems to improve innovative performance. ASIC firms that focus on mul-
tiple technology areas need to balance their technology portfolios across the areas: focusing for 
the late-evolution technologies and investing and diversifying for early-evolution technologies.
2. ASIC industry and technology
The ASIC industry is a part of the semiconductor industry that can be characterized as an 
independent market for design modules [11] that has been a driving force behind major 
technological breakthroughs in the semiconductor industry [12]. The history of this industry 
is well known: the inventions of the point contact transistor (by John Bardeen and Walter 
Brattain in 1947) and the junction transistor (by William Shockley in 1948) in the Bell Labs pro-
vided, together with the diffusion-oxide masking photo process (1954), the integrated circuit 
(1958), and planar technology (1959), and the foundations for the development of the global 
semiconductor industry [11, 13]. By 1961, it had developed into a worldwide billion-dollar 
industry [13]. Although the development of ASIC technology began at the end of the 1960s 
[14], it became popular in the 1980s [15]. In the 1980s it became possible to combine standard 
integrated circuits (ICs) into custom ICs that were tailored to particular systems or applica-
tions or Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) [16].
The successful development of ASICs requires the knowledge and competencies of different 
types of firms [17]. As a result, it is an industry characterized by newcomers, strategic alli-
ances, and mergers and acquisitions [17]. The dynamic patterns and the need for different 
knowledge and competencies make it an attractive industry for our type of research. The major 
firms currently active in the ASIC industry are Texas Instruments, Infineon Technologies, 
STMicroelectronics, Renesas Electronics, Analog Devices (which acquired Linear Technology 
in 2017), Maxim Integrated Products, NXP Semiconductors, ON Semiconductor, Qualcomm, 
and Intel [18]. All these major players are active in multiple segments of the semiconductor 
industry, ASIC being one of them.
Analogous to most semiconductor firms, ASIC firms initially worked according to the inte-
grated device manufacturer (IDM) business model. They vertically integrated every aspect of 
chip production, from design to manufacturing, packaging, and testing [19]. In 1984, Xilinx 
was the first firm adopting a “fabless” business model, focusing on the design of ASICs, and 
outsourcing its manufacturing to other “IDM” firms [19]. Soon after, in 1987, TSMC adopted 
a pure foundry business model, focusing on the manufacturing [20]. During the 1980s, most 
firms still used the IDM model. By now, most semiconductor firms use the fabless model, 
although a few major ones, such as Intel and STMicroelectronics, still use the IDM model, still 
accounting for about 55% of the market [21].
The industry reports generally define three ASIC subsegments:
• Full-custom design: a circuit that is customized on all mask layers and is sold to one 
customer.
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• Semi-custom design: a circuit that has one or more customized mask layers, but does not 
have all mask layers customized and is sold to one customer. This segment includes gate 
array and standard cell technologies [22], although standard cell is sometimes placed sepa-
rately in between full-custom and semi-custom designs.
• Programmable logic devices (PLD): a circuit with fuse that may be programmed (customized) 
and, in some cases, reprogrammed by the user. This segment includes CPLD, SPLD, and PAL 
technologies. FPGA technologies have in the past been regarded as a special kind of PLD but 
are now generally considered as a technology that competes with ASIC (see, e.g., [23]).
The three categories contain different devices with the same system functionalities that can 
be programmed at different moments in the development process; by the vendor (for stan-
dard cell, gate array), by the designer, prior to assembly (for full custom); or by the user (for 
PLD). Programmable logic devices offer the cheapest solution for low volumes. If volumes 
are higher and exceed a few thousand units, gate arrays offer the best solution. Full-custom 
devices are the best choice when production volumes exceed hundreds of thousands.
For the total ASIC industry, we can define the various phases of technology evolution based on 
our data. Based on the technological developments of all firms together, starting with the first 
patents developed in the ASIC industry, we can put the fluid phase before 1991, the transitional 
phase between 1992 and 1997, and the specific phase after 1998. This is an industry-level metric, 
which is in line with the framework of Abernathy and Utterback [9] and Utterback [24]. Figure 1 
shows the evolution of the number of firms in the industry. Although this data runs only until 
2003, we can clearly see a reduction in the number of firms, indicating a mature market.
Looking at the ASIC subsegments, we start with gate array technology, which existed in some 
form since the mid-1960s but did not capture a sizable share until around 1983 [15]. By the 
2010s this technology was hardly applied anymore [25]. In the mid-1980s, the standard cell 
was implemented. The first type of programmable logic device was invented in the 1970s [26], 
but the technology became more popular in the 1980s, and the PLD submarket became one 
of the fastest-growing sectors in the semiconductor industry. Figures 2 and 3 show the units 
Figure 1. Number of ASIC firms.
Application Specific Integrated Circuits - Technologies, Digital Systems and Design Methodologies18
sold and the prices per subsegment. These figures clearly indicate that the gate array technol-
ogy evolution preceded the standard cell and PLD technologies in time.
We identify four major technology trends in the ASIC industry (see also [27, 28]). The first 
trend is the continuation of Moore’s law through increasingly smaller DRAM pitch scales, 
increasing numbers of mask layers, and multi-patterning in lithography [29]. This trend is 
commonly referred to as “more Moore” [27, 28]. It entails strongly increasing cost of develop-
ment of ASICs. As a consequence, minimum efficient design scale (numbers of ASICs sold per 
design) increases, and only few large design firms (fabless or IDM) are able to continue profit-
able operations, an indication of a mature technological field [9]. This development also fits 
the trend of firms concentrating on core competencies by adopting a fabless business model.
The second trend is increased efficiency in manufacturing due to wafer-size increases. The 
share of 300 mm wafers is still increasing [30], and efforts were made to increase wafer sizes 
from 300 to 450 mm [29]), although the consortium of firms involved abandoned its efforts at 
Figure 2. ASIC units sold (in millions).
Figure 3. Price per unit (in USD).
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the end of 2016 [31]. This trend is mainly production process innovation, which like “more 
Moore” requires large investments in manufacturing facilities [29]. This, too, is a logical 
development in a mature technological field, and it fits in the trend of firms focusing on core 
competencies by adopting a foundry business model. Here, too, relatively few firms will be 
able to profitably carry out such investments because the minimum efficient scale of manu-
facturing ASICs increases.
These first two technology trends fit with market demand trends of ASICs as commodities 
for high-volume applications, such as Internet of Things, which require a lot of ASICs but not 
necessarily require leading-edge technology. Other markets with such demand are virtual 
and augmented reality, automotive electronics, smartphones, personal computing, and wear-
able electronics [32].
The third trend is added functionality, resulting in increasingly complex products for advanced 
applications such as machine learning or blockchain mining. This trend is commonly referred 
to as “more than Moore” [27, 28]. Examples of products are “software-defined hardware” or 
combinations of ASICs and general-purpose chips on a single-circuit board, like “domain-spe-
cific system-on-chip” [33] or “system-in-package” designs [27, 28]. This trend, too, indicates a 
relatively mature technological field with a focus on specific, albeit high-end, applications. This 
trend is accompanied by a shift from technology push-based roadmapping, to a more interactive 
approach in which multiple stakeholders are involved in defining future developments [27].
As a note on trends one till three: a mature technological field does not mean that technology 
does not develop or improve anymore. The technology still develops, e.g., in speed, power 
consumption, cost reductions, and performance for specific applications, but it develops in a 
relatively predictable direction and with a relatively predictable speed. This does not mean 
that such technology development becomes easier for firms: while the purely technological 
risks and uncertainties may be lower than before, the resource investments and the busi-
ness risks are considerable, as are the business opportunities. In business terms, the industry 
moved from exploring new technologies to exploiting existing technologies.
The fourth trend, perhaps more accurately a collection of trends, is the emergence of new 
technologies such as quantum computing or nano-carbon technology [28]. This trend deals 
with completely new technological fields, and it is not always immediately clear whether 
these are still related to “ASIC” or the emergence of a completely new industry. Such uncer-
tainty is a characteristic of the fluid phase of technology evolution [9]. This could be referred 
to as “beyond Moore.”
3. Theory
Technological knowledge is a resource that helps create innovation by enabling firms to add 
value to incoming factors of production [34]. Here, we look at the size and the diversity of 
firms’ technology portfolios. We would normally expect a positive effect of the size of the tech-
nology portfolio on innovative performance, because:
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1. Technological knowledge embedded in patents is often converted into innovative products 
that contribute to firm performance (see, e.g., [35]). Given a certain efficiency of this func-
tion, more input (patents) will result in higher performance.
2. Knowledge as a resource is indivisible and self-generating, which cause it to have strong 
static and dynamic economies of scale in its application [3]. Indivisibility [36] means that 
a certain critical mass of technological knowledge is needed before it can be productively 
applied. Therefore, more technological knowledge can be expected to create higher inno-
vative performance after this critical mass is reached. Self-generating ability [37] means 
that new relevant knowledge may emerge from the technology development process as 
additional output besides the normal output of (new) goods and services. The accumu-
lated knowledge then becomes a basis for subsequent technological developments [7].
3. A larger technology portfolio allows for more recombination of knowledge (e.g., [38]). The 
possible number of combinations of knowledge exponentially grows with the size of the 
portfolio.
However, the relationship between technology portfolio size and innovative performance is 
more complex than expected. Lin et al. [39] find nonsignificant effects of technology portfolio 
(technology stock) on firm performance metrics. Artz et al. [40] show that, while the direct 
effects of R&D input to patent output (invention) and of patent input to product announce-
ment output (innovation) are positive as expected, the indirect effect of R&D input on product 
announcement output is unexpectedly U-shaped and the indirect effect of patent input on 
firm performance is even negative.
The choice between a diverse and a focused knowledge base is one of the fundamental choices 
in a firm’s knowledge strategies [1]. We would normally expect a positive effect of technology 
diversity on innovative performance because:
1. A diverse technology portfolio may generate economies of scope, or “synergies,” meaning 
that it is more efficient to develop (related) technologies together than independently [3, 41].
2. Combining various technologies may generate “causal ambiguity,” meaning that competi-
tors are unable to determine the source of a firm’s competitive advantage and therefore 
may have difficulty imitating it [4].
3. If we see innovation as a process of “recombinant search” for new combinations, a more 
diverse portfolio may result in many more possible combinations [38, 42].
However, this relationship, too, is more complex than expected. More diversity leads to 
increased coordination cost, which may partly or wholly offset the benefits, dependent on 
the strength of the firm’s “integrative capabilities” [3]. Distributed technological capabili-
ties may limit the firm’s focus to develop strong core capabilities [43, 44]. The recombinant 
search advantage of a diverse portfolio depends on the degree of interdependency between 
components and on the size of the search space. Fleming and Sorenson [38] show that when 
interdependency is too high or too low, and when the search space is too large, recombinant 
ASIC Commercialization Analysis: Technology Portfolios and the Innovative Performance of ASIC…
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search will become progressively less efficient. Building on this literature, Leten et al. [44] and 
Huang and Chen [45] argue that the relationship between diversity and innovative perfor-
mance is complex and nonlinear. Lin [46] finds a nonsignificant relationship and suggests that 
diversity may interact with other variables.
A possible explanation for these complex results is that there is another variable that moder-
ates the relationships between the size and diversity of a technology portfolio and innova-
tive performance. We propose that technology evolution of an industry [9] is such a variable 
and that we may (partially) explain the complexities by including it in our model. We use 
Utterback’s model [24] for our definition of technology evolution. This is a refined and vali-
dated version of the original Abernathy and Utterback model [9]. It specifies three phases in 
technology evolution: the fluid phase, the transitional phase, and the specific phase.
During the fluid phase of technology evolution, technological uncertainty is high. Technology 
solutions are not readily available, and technology development investments are explorative 
and focused on product innovation [9]. In this phase, firms in high-tech industries require 
technological scientific knowledge, i.e., knowledge gained through fundamental scientific 
research [47]. As a result of the uncertainty, firms do not know exactly which technologi-
cal knowledge, i.e., which patents or combinations of patents, will improve their innovative 
performance.
They need to keep many options open and need to explore multiple different technological 
trajectories. To gain innovative performance in the early phases of technology evolution, firms 
need a large and diverse technology portfolio. A diverse technological knowledge base allows 
a firm to adapt [2] to turbulent environments and to develop a higher number of technologies. 
It also reduces the danger of a lock-in into dead-end technologies [48], and it hedges against 
the risks of developing the wrong technology [49]. As a result, diversification is positively 
associated with innovative performance. As technological scientific knowledge solutions are 
not readily available internally or externally, they need to be developed, adding to the port-
folio size. Often, because of indivisibilities, various sub-technologies have to be developed 
simultaneously to create feasible technology solutions. When firms plan to source knowledge 
externally, they first need to develop a stock of knowledge internally that will enable them 
to scan and absorb external knowledge [7, 50]. During technology development, an increase 
in the number of components results in an exponentially larger number of possible combina-
tions [38]. Grant [2] argues that different types of specialized knowledge are complements 
rather than substitutes, meaning that they are most useful when combined, or that there are 
economies of scope. A diverse technological knowledge base is required to be creative [47] 
and to create cross-fertilization between technological areas, which increases innovative per-
formance [48]. Incidentally, this kind of cross-fertilization resembles the layout of the Bell 
Labs Murray Hill building in which the transistor was invented by design enabling—almost 
forcing—close contacts between researchers from different technological disciplines [51].
In the transitional phase of technology evolution, technological uncertainty decreases. Firms 
have had the chance to learn and acquire knowledge in the previous phase. Technological solu-
tions are available, and technology development investments become more exploitative. In this 
phase, technology requirements shift toward application-related knowledge [47] and toward 
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knowledge of process rather than product innovations. More certainty means that it is no longer 
necessary to explore many technological trajectories. In this phase, it is necessary to have a tech-
nology portfolio that is close to the dominant design. Therefore, in the transitional phase, firms 
require a smaller technology portfolio to gain innovative performance. To appropriate returns on 
technological knowledge, this knowledge should be unique to the firm, focused on the unique-
ness of the portfolio not on portfolio size. When a firm needs technological knowledge outside of 
its own area of competence, there is a good chance that such knowledge is available with other 
firms and can be externally sourced. This also reduces the need to maintain large portfolios, 
provided the firm built up sufficient absorptive capacity in the fluid phase. Limiting the num-
bers of technologies generates cost advantages and thereby increases performance. Focusing 
the technology portfolio on the dominant design enables the firm to generate innovations that 
the market accepts, thereby increasing innovative performance. Having a unique technology 
portfolio close to its core competencies allows the firm to appropriate returns from the technol-
ogy, which also leads to higher innovative performance. Since technology-related uncertainty 
is lower in this phase, firms can specialize rather than diversify their technological knowledge 
base, focusing on a narrow technological area [39] related to the dominant design. This creates 
important financial savings, which may be invested to improve the technological core, and in 
turn enables firms to outperform their rivals and maintain their technological leadership [39]. As 
much of the required technological scientific knowledge is available in this phase, either inside 
or outside of the firm’s boundaries, the necessity to develop the scope of this knowledge is much 
lower. In this phase, it is more important to find the right applications for the knowledge that 
has been developed. Instead of being flexible and keeping all options open, firms should focus 
on their key technologies and core competencies [52]. This means increased specialization, lead-
ing to efficiency gains in knowledge acquisition and storage [34]. This applies especially when 
knowledge is specific to products or dominant designs because it is less subject to economies 
of scope than nonspecific knowledge [34]. During the transition phase, the cost aspect becomes 
more important, and it is too expensive to maintain a broad technological diversification.
In the specific phase of technology evolution, technological uncertainty is low, and most rel-
evant technological knowledge is readily available. In this phase, firms need a small core tech-
nology portfolio to gain innovative performance. The dominant design is firmly established, 
and it is clear which technological knowledge is relevant. Since the technologies and products 
commoditize, cost savings are important, and maintaining a smaller portfolio will increase 
performance. During this phase, market-related rather than technology-related knowledge 
is required, and a large technological knowledge base is no longer necessary. As firms in 
this phase focus on exploiting existing knowledge, the uniqueness and protection of knowl-
edge are even more important than in the transition phase. As it is not necessary to develop 
new technological knowledge, the economies of scope of a diverse portfolio no longer apply. 
It therefore makes sense to limit the technology portfolio to save resources. Any necessary 
related technological knowledge that is not available internally could easily be externally 
sourced. Saved resources can be invested in understanding the market and exploiting the 
firm’s core technologies better.
In summary, we reason that during the fluid phase, firms need to develop large and diverse 
technology portfolios to cope with uncertainty and to keep development options open. In 
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later phases, after a dominant design appears and technological uncertainty is lower, firms 
will benefit more from smaller, specialized portfolios that can be more easily protected and 
exploited. Based on this reasoning, we formulate the following hypotheses:
H1: Firms with a large technology portfolio in earlier phases of technology evolution will achieve higher 
innovative performance than firms with a large technology portfolio in later phases.
H2: Firms with a diverse technology portfolio in earlier phases of technology evolution will achieve 
higher innovative performance than firms with a diverse technology portfolio in later phases.
4. Data and methods
We test our hypotheses in the ASIC industry because it is knowledge-intensive, technology-
intensive, and dynamic [11]. This makes it possible to measure the impact of the size and 
diversity of the internal technology portfolio on the innovative performance of ASIC firms 
during the phases of ASIC technology evolution.
We constructed a panel dataset that includes data from 300 ASIC firms and selected all 67 
ASIC firms with innovative performance from this dataset for the period 1986–2003, using the 
Integrated Circuit Engineering ASIC-Outlook industry reports (1986–1999) and the Integrated 
Circuit Engineering status reports (1980–1999) until 1999. For the period between 2000 and 2003, 
we used the IC Insights reports [53], Compustat, product guides, Gartner reports, and data of 
the World Semiconductor Trade Statistics Corporation. We selected these firms based on the 
available data from the Integrated Circuit Engineering Corporation and IC Insights Company.
To measure our dependent variable, innovative performance, we collected data on the num-
ber of ASIC patents during 1986–2003 at t = i (where i = 1986, 1987, … 2003). Figure 4 shows 
an example of a firm’s innovative performance over time.
We measured the first independent variable, the size of a firm’s technology portfolio, by col-
lecting data on the number of successful ASIC patent applications measured at t = i minus 
5 (where i = 1986, 1987, … 2003). We added all submarket-related patents per segment 
(PLD + gate array + standard cell) in 5 years prior to the year of observation. Henderson and 
Cockburn [54] recommend this moving window of 5 years, arguing that prior technologies 
can be expected to contribute to the development of new technologies. Figure 5 shows an 
example of a firm’s technology portfolio size over time.
We measured the second independent variable, the diversity of a firm’s technology portfolio, 
by collecting data on the types of ASIC patents (PLD, gate array, standard cell) and by adding 
up all three submarket-related patents that a firm received during 5 years prior to the year of 
observation. This diversity is based on three types of technologies (PLD, gate array, standard 
cell) that the portfolios may contain in each year, which means that the value of this variable 
varies between 0 and 3: 0 if a firm has zero technologies in a year, 1 if a firm has one ASIC 
technology in its portfolios, etc. Figure 6 shows an example of a firm’s technology portfolio 
diversity over time.
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Figure 4. Example innovative performance.
Figure 5. Example technology portfolio size.
Figure 6. Example technology portfolio diversity.
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We measured the moderating variable, technology evolution, based on its three phases: the 
fluid phase between 1986 and 1991, the transitional phase between 1992 and 1997, and the spe-
cific phase between 1998 and 2003. We use an industry-level metric, which is in line with the 
framework of Abernathy and Utterback [9] and Utterback [24]. It is based on the technological 
developments of all firms together, starting with the first patents developed in the ASIC indus-
try. The metric is the same across the three subsegments, PLD, gate array, and standard cell.
We computed the interaction effect of technology portfolio size and technology evolution 
phase and the interaction effect of the technology portfolio diversity and technology evolu-
tion phase by multiplying the independent variables involved in the interaction. To enhance 
interpretability and eliminate nonessential multicollinearity, we standardized the indepen-
dent variables in the interaction terms prior to computing those interaction terms [55]. We 
standardized the variables by first subtracting the overall mean from the value for each case, 
resulting in a mean of zero. We then divided the difference between the individual’s score and 
the mean by the standard deviation, which results in a standard deviation of one.
We include five control variables. We measured the size of a firm’s strategic alliance network 
as the number of cooperative relationships between firms: a firm’s degree centrality [56]. We 
calculated this for each year using UCINET software. We use cooperation between firms over 
the last 5 years prior to the year of observation. We measured firm size as the natural log of 
the number of employees. Because larger firms are more dominant and have more financial 
Variable Time Description Mean SD Min. Max.
Innovative 
performance
t = i Number of ASIC patents per year 151 409 0 4764
Technology portfolio 
size
t = i − 5 Number of successful patent applications 590 1592 0 19,454
Technology portfolio 
diversity
t = i − 5 Zero, one, two, or three types of ASIC 
patents (PLD, gate array, standard cell) in the 
technology portfolio
1.35 1.24 0 3
Technology evolution t = i 0 = fluid phase, 1 = transitional phase, 
2 = specific phase
0.94 0.81 0 2
Alliance network size t = i − 5 Normalized degree centrality 0.80 0.84 0 5.3
Firm size t = i Natural log of the number of employees 8.81 2.77 2.30 13.00
R&D/sales ratio t = i Percentage of sales invested in research and 
development
13% 15% 0% 300%
Asia region t = i Dummy variable denoting that the 
headquarters are located in Asia 
(default = America)
0.25 0.43 0 1
Europe region t = i Dummy variable denoting that the 
headquarters are located in Europe 
(default = America)
0.18 0.38 0 1
Table 1. Overview of the variables.






























0.20 0.31 0.32 1.00
Alliance network 
size
0.22 0.26 0.46 0.28 1.00
Firm size −0.00 0.03 0.42 −0.02 0.27 1.00
R&D/sales ratio −0.01 −0.00 −0.11 0.03 −0.07 −0.43 1.00
Asia region −0.06 0.04 0.27 0.05 −0.19 0.35 −0.27 1.00
Europe region −0.14 −0.14 −0.09 −0.03 0.17 0.31 −0.05 −0.25 1.00
Table 2. Correlations.
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means and resources to invest in R&D than smaller firms, they may have a higher innovation 
output compared to smaller firms due to economies of scale. We used a natural log because 
the number of employees is not normally distributed and the order of magnitude of the firm 
matters rather than its exact size. We used a firm’s R&D expenses as a percentage of total sales, 
to check for the firm’s propensity to invest in R&D. We also controlled for region indicating 
whether the firm’s headquarters are located in America, in Asia, or in Europe.
Table 1 gives an overview of the variables. The firm-level data show a high average R&D 
intensity of 13% and a high average of 590 ASIC patents in the firms’ portfolio, which indicate 
that the ASIC industry is knowledge-intensive and technology-intensive.
To test the hypotheses, we composed a longitudinal panel dataset. We conducted Hausman 
tests to decide whether to use fixed or random effect models. The panel analyses with the 
dependent count variable innovative performance are based on weighted patents. The mean 
and variance of the count distribution of these weighted patents are unequal, which means 
over-dispersion of the data, resulting in the need for a negative binomial regression [57].
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix. Based on the robustness of the test results (pair-wise 
exclusion of the variables with high correlations), no variables need to be excluded to avoid 
multicollinearity. Based on the results of the Hausman test, we selected fixed effects models 
for testing both hypotheses.
5. Results
To check our hypotheses, we test three models, the results of which are presented in Table 3. 
Model 1 is the baseline model that tests the direct effects of technology portfolio size and 
technology portfolio diversity on innovative performance. The model indicates positive and 
significant effects of portfolio size and portfolio diversity on a firm’s innovative performance.
Model 2 tests how the technology evolution stage influences the relationship between technol-
ogy portfolio size and innovative performance. It does so by including the interaction term 
of technology portfolio size and the phase of technology evolution. The estimates show that 
technology evolution negatively moderates the relationship between the size of the technol-
ogy portfolio and the firm’s innovative performance. It means that in later phases of the tech-
nology evolution, firms with smaller portfolios perform better. This supports Hypothesis 1.
Model 3 tests how the technology evolution stage influences the relationship between tech-
nology portfolio diversity and innovative performance. It does so by including the interaction 
term of technology portfolio diversity and the phase of technology evolution. The estimates 
show that technology evolution negatively moderates the relationship between the diver-
sity of the technology portfolio and the firm’s innovative performance. It means that in later 
phases of the technology evolution, firms with less diverse portfolios perform better. This 
supports Hypothesis 2.
All models indicate that larger firms and firms with larger networks have higher innovative 
performance, which is in line with findings of Gopalakrishnan and Bierly [58]. Larger firms 
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have larger knowledge bases, and firms with larger networks are able to attract more external 
knowledge, which can be complementary to internally developed technology. Given the posi-
tive and significant main effects, the effects of these two control variables are not surprising.
The models also show that R&D investments, measured as the R&D/sales ratio, have nonsig-
nificant effects on innovative performance. While this may seem surprising, there are vari-
ous possible explanations. First, in our data, R&D investment is measured for all the firm’s 
technologies, not specifically for the ASIC technologies. Many of the firms in our dataset also 
develop non-ASIC technologies, so that only a part of their R&D investment is related to 
ASIC development. Second, the effects of R&D on performance have sometimes been found 
to be nonsignificant or curvilinear (e.g., [40]), and these effects are not captured in our model. 
Model 1 (main 
effects)
Model 2 (portfolio size and 
technology evolution)
Model 3 (portfolio diversity and 
technology evolution)
Fixed effects♯♯ Fixed effects♯♯ Fixed effects♯♯
Technology portfolio size 0.000107*** (0.000) 0.000368*** (0.000) 0.000127*** (0.000)
Technology portfolio 
diversity
0.726*** (0.109) 0.586*** (0.110) 0.675*** (0.107)
Technology evolution 
phase











Alliance network size 0.356*** (0.055) 0.350*** (0.054) 0.358*** (0.055)
Firm size 0.146*** (0.032) 0.164*** (0.032) 0.183*** (0.034)
R&D/sales ratio −0.0162 (0.411) 0.065 (0.416) 0.0646 (0.408)
Asia region 0.772*** (0.147) 0.788*** (0.149) 0.763*** (0.147)
Europe region −0.625*** (0.195) −0.619*** (0.198) −0.768*** (0.197)
Constant −3.315*** (0.311) −3.435*** (0.314) −3.776*** (0.334)
Number of observations 807 807 807
Number of firms 59 59 59
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
♯To calculate the interaction terms, we standardized the variables. For the main effects, the variables are not standardized.
♯♯The values of the Hausman test are for Model 1 Prob > χ2 = 0.0042, for Model 2 Prob > χ2 = 0.0001, and for Model 3 
Prob > χ2 = 0.0000. Since the tests are significant (p < 0.05), the null hypothesis is rejected, and the fixed effects model is 
most appropriate.
Table 3. Results.
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Related to this, R&D spending is regarded as an input to the development of a technology 
portfolio and may therefore be subject to the efficiency of the “invention production function” 
that is not captured in our model.
Finally, the models show that relatively more innovative firms were located in Asia and 
relatively fewer in Europe between 1986 and 2003. Explanations for this are that more ASIC-
developing firms are based in Asia and fewer in Europe to begin with and that during this 
period some European firms exited the sector, whereas in Asia new players entered.
6. Discussion
The main effect of portfolio size is positive and significant in base Model 1 and remains so 
when we include the moderating effect of technology evolution in Model 2. Thus, firms with 
a larger portfolio show a better innovative performance, regardless of the phase of technology 
evolution. This is in line with earlier findings of Ernst [35], Fleming and Sorenson [38], and 
Granstrand [3].
We find that technology evolution negatively and significantly moderates the relationship 
between technology portfolio size and innovative performance. This is a possible explanation 
for the previous conflicting results of Lin et al. [39] and Artz et al. [32]. Our results indicate 
that it is more beneficial for a firm to have a relatively large portfolio in an earlier phase of 
technology evolution and to reduce the size of its portfolio in later phases. To put it differ-
ently, in the earlier phases, firms are more focused on production of knowledge from R&D, 
whereas in later phases, they are more focused on production of innovation from knowledge. 
Conducting cross-sectional research in an earlier phase would result in underestimating the 
production of innovations from R&D, while doing so in a later phase would result in overes-
timating the production of innovations from R&D.
If we return to the characteristics of technological knowledge as we mentioned before, namely, 
economies of scale [3], indivisibilities [36], and self-generative abilities [37], firms likely need 
to accumulate a certain critical mass of technological knowledge in earlier phases before such 
knowledge becomes productive and leads to innovative performance. Conversely, in later 
phases, when such critical mass has been reached, it should be easier to achieve innovative 
performance, and expanding the technology portfolio is unnecessary.
Our findings for the portfolio diversity are similar to those for portfolio size. Here, too, the 
main effect of portfolio diversity on innovative performance is positive for base Model 1 and 
for Model 3 that includes the moderating effect of technology evolution. This is in line with 
earlier findings of Granstrand [3] and Breschi et al. [59] that a diverse portfolio is associated 
with innovativeness.
We find that technology evolution negatively and significantly moderates the relationship 
between technology portfolio diversity and innovative performance. This finding comple-
ments existing explanations of the complexity of the relationship between technology 
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portfolio diversity and innovative performance. Our research indicates that it is beneficial for 
a firm to have a relatively diverse portfolio in earlier phases of technology evolution and to 
reduce portfolio diversity in later phases.
It is widely recognized that this relationship is complex. Granstrand [3] argued that the coor-
dination and integration costs of multidisciplinary R&D become higher with increased diver-
sification. Research by Leten et al. [44] and Huang and Chen [45] confirms this argument. 
They found an inverted U-shaped effect of technological diversification on technological 
performance. While technological diversification enables combination and recombination, 
(too) high levels of diversification provide only marginal benefits due to high coordination 
and integration costs.
Our findings complement this explanation by arguing that more coordination efforts are 
needed in the earlier phases of technology evolution when technologies are unknown and 
that less coordination efforts are needed later when the relevant technologies are much bet-
ter known. Therefore, we suggest that the inverted U-shape will have steeper slopes during 
earlier phases of technology evolution, when there are both high benefits from technology 
diversity and high costs of technology diversification. The inverted U-shape will have gentler 
slopes in later phases, when the benefits from technology diversity are less and the cost of 
technology diversification is lower.
Whether the firm can gain net benefits from the balance between technology diversity and 
coordination costs depends on the integrative capabilities of both technologists and managers 
[3]. If the firm possesses the capabilities to integrate diverse technologies, this is associated 
with causal ambiguity and sustainable competitive advantage [4].
7. Conclusions
The relationships between the size and diversity of firms’ internal technology portfolios and 
their innovative performance are complex. We contribute to the literature by introducing 
technology evolution as a moderating variable of the relationship between internal technol-
ogy sourcing and innovative performance. Our results support these moderating effects. The 
findings from our study contribute to explaining the complexity of the relationships between 
technology portfolio size and diversity and innovative performance by offering a possible 
explanation for conflicting empirical findings (technology portfolio size) and by offering an 
explanation that complements earlier findings (technology portfolio diversity).
Our findings suggest that during earlier phases of ASIC technology evolution, ASIC firms 
need broad technological portfolios and technological capabilities to keep their options open 
to adapt [2], to avoid lock-in [48], and to avoid investing in the wrong technology [49]. Such 
a broad portfolio requires strong integrative capabilities to profit from technology diversity. 
As such in earlier phases, causal ambiguity is created, making the firm’s innovation difficult 
to imitate. During later phases of ASIC technology evolution, ASIC firms need to focus on 
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their core technologies and their core capabilities [52], in which the causal ambiguity has been 
embedded. In these phases, the role of integrative capabilities would be less pronounced.
For managers in the ASIC industry, our results imply that they need to invest in a large and 
diverse technology portfolio in the early phase of technology evolution and need to maintain 
relatively smaller and less diverse technology portfolios later on, to optimize their firm’s 
innovative performance. Having a large and diverse ASIC portfolio in early phases of tech-
nology evolution gives the firm the flexibility to keep all options open during uncertain peri-
ods, while a smaller and specialized portfolio contributes to a focus on the core competencies 
in more certain periods. In the fluid phase, ASIC firms need to explore the technology space 
by developing a large and diverse technological knowledge portfolio. In the transitional 
phase, they need to reduce the size and diversity of their technological knowledge base and 
focus on their own unique knowledge contribution within the dominant design, applying 
knowledge from their core technological base. In the specific phase, they need to concentrate 
on a small, focused, unique, protectable, and exploitable technological knowledge base.
ASIC technology is currently in the specific phase, and it therefore may make most sense 
for ASIC firms to focus on such a small, focused, unique, protectable, and exploitable 
technological knowledge base. As we argued in our discussion of the trends in the ASIC 
industry, they can do this by focusing on cost reduction and large-scale production of 
commodity products to earn back the ever-larger design and production investments or by 
focusing on providing added functionality solutions for specific high-end applications. Of 
course, while doing so, they need to separately manage their portfolios regarding emerg-
ing technologies. If they want to play an active role in such emerging technologies, they 
will need to develop large and diverse portfolios again to deal with the uncertainties that 
such technologies bring.
The research described in this chapter has several limitations, which can provide directions 
for future research. First, we tested the effects of the size and diversity of the technology 
portfolio separately. We recognize that the combination of both effects may have an impact 
on innovative performance as well. Lin et al. [39] suggest that firms with smaller knowledge 
stocks should concentrate on a specific technological field and that the size of the knowledge 
stock may moderate the relationship between diversification and performance. This implies 
that, for individual firms, there may be different roads to success: either building large and 
diversified technology portfolios (e.g., Intel or Texas Instruments) or developing small and 
focused technology portfolios (e.g., SK Hynix). Future research could investigate the impli-
cations of technology evolution for both these roads, e.g., by case study analyses. Second, 
we did not specifically include the interactions between internal and external sourcing 
through the innovation network. The past research indicates complementarities between 
internal and external technology sourcing (e.g., [8, 50]). This implies that firms could, for 
example, combine internally focused portfolios with external cooperation to ensure the nec-
essary diversity. Further research could extend out model to include such effects. Finally, 
we did not include the effects of mergers, acquisitions, buyouts, and spin-offs as vehicles to 
manage and build technology portfolios. This, too, could be addressed by future research 
using case study analyses.
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